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The Recognition of the United States: How
European Nations Recognized the Sovereignty
of America
By Jesus Ruvalcaba
Abstract: The diplomacy between the United States and countries
in Europe during the Revolutionary War (1775–1783) has been of
note for historians throughout American history as one can see
how the United States’ foreign policy began to develop during the
war due to international diplomacy. However, the specific
discourse surrounding the diplomacy of American recognition has
been lacking, in particular from the perspective of the European
powers who formally recognized the United States as a sovereign
country. The process of recognition is a vital part to the
development of any country, both new and established. In addition
to being vital, it is also beneficial. Yet how could recognition be
beneficial for both countries, the recognized and the recognizee, at
the same time? This article focuses on the perspective of three
European countries (France, the United Provinces, and Great
Britain) and key American diplomats to uncover the complex
process of how the United States became a recognized country by
major European powers. By examining the motives of each
European country individually, one can see how the recognition of
a new country is beneficial to established countries and how it falls
within their desired foreign policy. Recognition and diplomacy
also show the ambitions of certain political figures within the
United States, as each individual had conflicting views on the
development of the new American country.
The recognition of a country by those around the global
community is an important step towards their development. Some
of the requirements that are needed to be considered a sovereign
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country are a permanent population, a defined territory, one
government, and the ability to pursue the relations with other
sovereign states, in addition to having the idea of being
independent. The recognition of the state acknowledges the
sovereignty of the newly formed entity, therefore making the
country viable as a force to trade, create alliances, or even go to
war with. Countries today continue to struggle to acquire that
recognition from the global community.1 However, what about the
United States? Like all newly formed countries of today, the
United States had to go through a similar process to be recognized
by European powers in the eighteenth century. The United States
declared independence from Great Britain on July 4, 1776,
however, the first official recognition of United States sovereignty
by a European power did not come until years after following the
American Revolution (1775–1783).
The first European power to recognize the United States
was France, arguably the country’s first European ally. A few
years later, countries such as the United Provinces, and eventually
Great Britain would also recognize the United States and its
sovereignty. Even though the recognition of the United States was
important for the Americans, the recognition of the new country
allowed others (like France, the United Provinces, and Great
Britain) to gain from American independence. The recognition
gave the United States influence in decisions as a country, yet this
would not have happened unless European countries gained from
the recognition. This piece will concentrate on the French, Dutch,
American, and British perspectives, as each of these offers a view
of the war with the British and how American recognition related
to that war. For the French, recognition meant the balancing of
power. For the Dutch, recognition meant a revival of the once
1

The recognition of a country is a subjective matter. While one country can
recognize a new country, another can choose not to. Looking at the United
Nations, since they are the global organizations in which a majority of all
countries participate in global diplomacy, countries such as Palestine, Kosovo,
Taiwan, and Western Sahara are a few of the countries that have not received
recognition by the global organization, all for various reasons.

128

Jesus Ruvalcaba

flourishing country whereas for the American revolutionaries,
recognition meant liberty from the British empire. And for the
British, recognition was a way for them to maintain their
international status. By focusing on the process of American
recognition, one can find an added layer to not just the diplomacy
of the war, which primarily focuses on the American perspective,
but to the status quo of the Western world, as it aids to understand
why certain countries have not achieved recognition by already
established countries.
The diplomacy of the United States has been well covered
by various historians. One of these historians, Jonathan Dull,
provides a detailed coverage of this diplomacy, putting it within
the European context in order to understand how alliances and
decisions were made during the American Revolution, as the
previous history of American diplomacy was outdated.2 However,
historians do not focus on the recognition of the United States, let
alone the process behind it. Instead, historians focus more on the
broad events of diplomacy during the American Revolution or
choose to focus on the diplomatic aspects that are required for their
personal research. Thus, by focusing on the recognition of the
United States, this paper will add to the existing discourse of
diplomacy during the Revolutionary War, concentrating on the
recognition of the United States, a part of history that is not
discussed as much.
French Perspective
As previously mentioned, the process of recognition for the United
States has not been an area of focus for historians. For the FrancoAmerican alliance (1778–1783), however, the diplomacy between
the two countries has been better discussed. For example, a large
part of Jonathan Dull’s book, A Diplomatic History of the
American Revolution, published in 1985, focuses on the French
2

Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (Yale
University Press, 1985).
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view of diplomacy in relation to the Revolutionary War. Historian
Ronald Hoffman’s 1981 book, Diplomacy and Revolution: The
Franco-American Alliance of 1778, discusses the relationship of
France and the United States leading up to the signing of the
Treaty of Alliance in 1778, which recognized the United States as
a country from the French side.3 For the French, there were three
figures that dictated the recognition of the United States: the Count
of Vergennes Charles Gravier (1719–1787), the Ambassador of
France to the United States Conrad-Alexandre Gérard de Rayneval
(1729–1790), and King Louis XVI (1754–1793). Between these
three, the recognition of the United States occurred in a way that
benefited the French and King Louis XVI’s foreign policy. For the
French, the recognition of the United States was not about
recognizing the sovereignty of the new country, but rather, was a
way to create a balance of power that weakened the influence and
strength that the British empire held in both Europe and the North
American colonies.
During the reign of King Louis XVI (r. 1774–1792), one of
the aspects of French foreign policy was to maintain a balance of
power within the European continent.4 However, as the eighteenth
century progressed, British power expanded, creating an imbalance
of powers within the European powers. The rise of revolutionary
sentiment in the American Colonies provided the opportunity for
King Louis XVI and France to exploit and decrease the influence
the British had in North America and Europe. In a verbal response
from King Louis XVI in early 1777, he expressed his support
towards the revolutionary effort by his willingness to provide eight
ships to defend the shores of the United States from the incoming
British attacks along with allowing American sailors to use the
ports within France, Spain, and the United Provinces.5 The intent
3

Ronald Hoffman, Diplomacy and Revolution: The Franco-American Alliance
of 1778 (University of Virginia Press,
4
Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, 33-40.
5
Charles Gravier, “The King’s Answer to the American Commissioners, 13
January, 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, January 13, 1777,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-23-02-0097.
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of the French monarch was to weaken British power by removing a
large portion of the British colonies in the Americas from their
possession, while at the same time creating an informal alliance
between the French, Spanish, and Dutch against the British in
Europe.6
However, within this verbal response there is also
hesitation from the French monarch to provide full support to the
Americans for their war against the British. King Louis XVI
recognized the strength of the British Navy, which was
considerably larger than the French fleet. By outwardly supporting
the American revolutionaries, the French placed themselves in a
position to go to war directly with the British, a war which the
country was not ready to take on considering they were still
recovering from the high number of casualties during the Seven
Years’ War (1756–1763).7 The Americans noticed this skepticism
from both the French monarch and the Count of Vergennes,
Charles Gravier, in which, rather than it being a certain promise,
French aid appeared to be superficial at least in regard to sending
French ships to the American coast.8 For a majority of the French
monarchy and governing body, helping the American cause—let
alone recognizing the sovereignty of the newly formed country—
was a large risk that would drive the French into a war that could
potentially not provide any benefit.9
One of the supporters of the American cause was ConradAlexadre Gérard, the French ambassador to the United States.
From the early stages of the Franco-American diplomatic
6

Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, 33-40
Gravier, “The King’s Answer to the American Commissioners, 13 January,
1777.”
8
American Commissioners, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee,
“The American Commissioners to Gérard, 14 January 1777,” Founders Online,
National Archives, January 14, 1777,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-23-02-0102.
9
American Commissioners, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee,
“The American Commissioners to Gérard, 14 January 1777,” Founders Online,
National Archives, January 14, 1777,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-23-02-0102.
7
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relationship, Gérard became an advocate of the American cause,
even providing funds to the American revolutionaries when the
French monarchy did not.10 In order to attain more support from
the French, the Americans needed to demonstrate their ability to
support the French similarly to how the Americans were receiving
help from the French and their allies. Whether it as through
financial support (which was difficult considering the United
States was a new country) or a strong defensive alliance (which
was against the foreign policy the United States wanted to pursue),
the United States had to demonstrate their ability to support the
French in a way that aided France’s foreign policy of balancing the
powers in Europe by weakening the British.
Between September 19 and October 17, 1777, the Battle of
Saratoga occurred between the Americans and the British. This
battle was decisive in the process of attaining recognition from
France. The United States defeated the British at Saratoga,
showing all of Europe, in particular the French, that the United
States had the ability to compete with the already established
European powers. After this battle, there was an even greater
urgency from the French to create an alliance with the United
States, as the new country showed that it could defend its
independence from the British. In his letter to the American
Commissioners, Gérard opened by stating, “M. Gérard désirant
d’avoir l’honneur de voir Messieurs Franklin, Deane et Lee demain
matin [Mr. Gérard wishes to have the honor of seeing gentlemen.
Franklin, Deane and Lee tomorrow morning],” in order to begin
the process of creating a treaty between the United States and
France that recognized the United States as a new country.11 In
addition to the ability to defend itself, the victory showed that the
United States could be a worthy ally for the French against the
10

American Commissioners, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee,
“The American Commissioners to Gérard, 14 January 1777.”
11
Conrad-Alexandre Gérard, “Conrad-Alexandre Gérard to the American
Commissioners 5 December, 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives,
December 5, 1777, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-020176.
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British, thereby creating a balance of powers through alliances,
which was a primary goal for French diplomacy at the time12. In
response, the Americans immediately dispatched diplomats to
France to discuss the recognition of their sovereignty. Attaining the
recognition of the United States as a sovereign nation showed other
European powers that the United States was on the same level as
them.13 And thus, the negotiations began over what would become
the Treaty of Alliance (1778) between the French and Americans.
Within the Treaty of Alliance, the French managed to
create a treaty that benefited them profoundly for recognizing the
United States. For the Americans, the Treaty of Alliance had the
French recognize the sovereignty of the United States while at the
same time to receive more direct aid from the French.14 Even
though the main purpose of the treaty was to recognize the United
States as a country, for the French it was quite different. France
took the opportunity to make the Treaty of Alliance a proper
defense alliance in their favor against the British to create their
version of the balance of powers. The first article within the treaty
does not recognize the sovereignty of the United States, but rather
it states that “the said United States, shall make a common cause
and aid [to its allies] mutually.”15 This refers to the fact that if
Great Britain was to go to war with France, then the United States
had to support the French. The first acknowledgement that the
treaty makes for the recognition of the United States is not
12

Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, 34
The American Commissioners, “The American Commissioner to [Gérard] 20
December, 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, December 20, 1777,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-02-0240.
14
American Commissioners, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, John
Adams, “The American Commissioners to [Gérard] 30 January1778,” Founders
Online, National Archives, January 30, 1778,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-02-0423.
15
Gérard, Conrad-Alexandre, American Commissioners, Benjamin Franklin,
Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, and John Adams, “The Franco-American Treaty of
Alliance, Article 1, 6 February 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives,
February 6, 1778, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-020476.
13
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mentioned until Article 2, which is when the treaty directly states
“the essential and direct End of the present defensive alliance is to
maintain effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence
absolute and unlimited of the said United States.”16 Likewise, the
treaty made it so that the United States could not end their war
with Great Britain unless the French agreed to sue for peace as
well.
Article 8 of the Treaty of Alliance states that “neither of the
two parties shall conclude truce or peace with Great Britain,
without the formal consent of the other first obtained,” creating a
relationship between the French and Americans that made those of
the new country somewhat reliant on the decisions of those in
Europe, specifically France.17 This article is important regarding
the sovereignty of the United States. Even though the French
recognized the United States as an independent country, it is clear
that the French were now attempting to have the United States as a
satellite state (a formally independent country that remains under
the political, economic, and military influence or control of another
country), in which they had to rely on the French for decisions.
This marked a change within the Franco-American diplomatic
relationship, as the United States was no longer looking for
recognition from the French as a sovereign country, but rather a
self-reliant independent country.

16

Gérard, Franklin, Deane, Lee, Adams, “Treaty of Alliance with France
(1778): Article 2,” National Archives, accessed May 5, 2022,
https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/treaty-of-alliance-with-france.
17
Gérard, Franklin, Deane, Lee, Adams, “Treaty of Alliance with France
(1778): Article 8,” National Archives, accessed May 5, 2022,
https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/treaty-of-alliance-with-france.
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Figure 1. Signing of the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United
States. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.18

Once the Treaty of Alliance was ratified and signed, the
Revolutionary War came to include the French. Yet, because of the
language within the treaty, it made American independence more
of a partial recognition of sovereignty rather than an
acknowledgement of the United States as a country capable of
making its own decisions. In a letter from John Adams (1735–
1826) to Henry Laurens (1724–1792), then-President of the
Continental Congress, Adams discusses how the King of Britain,
George III (1738–1820), made another attempt to achieve peace
without the involvement of the French.19 In the end, the Americans
did not attempt to make peace with Britain due to the treaty that
the Americans signed with the French. The alliance created a
18

Charles E. Mills, “The Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and of
Alliance between France and the United States,” Library of Congress, January 1,
1970, https://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/det.4a26451/.
19
John Adams, “From John Adams to Henry Laurens, 27 July 1778,” Founders
Online, National Archives, July 27, 1778,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-06-02-0249.
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situation between the French and Americans that made the United
States reliant on France for major decisions regarding the
Revolutionary War, therefore showing how France’s foreign policy
regarding the balance of power within Europe was being achieved.
If the American revolutionaries could not make peace with Great
Britain on their own without French consent, then the Americans
would be forced to align with the French, regardless of any conflict
that arose, creating a supposed balance of power in Europe
between the French and the British.
It was not until a few years later, when the recognition of
the United States by the Dutch began to seem feasible, that the
United States and its diplomats were considered independent in
making decisions. The United States needed more loans for the
war, and Adams thought it best to approach the Dutch for that
money in order to “render us less dependent on France.”20 Gravier
and the French court feared that any acceptance of a loan by the
United States from the Dutch would lead to an Anglo-Dutch war, a
war between Great Britain and the Dutch, thereby denying the
French from receiving aid from the Dutch for the Revolutionary
War. With the Dutch at war with the British, the Dutch could not
be able to financially aid France in their war against the British. In
addition to this, France lost its grip on the United States and was
not in charge of the decisions that the United States made in regard
to its foreign policy. By allowing Adams to travel to the Hague, the
capital of political and economic issues in the United Provinces, to
negotiate with the Dutch for loans, the French were recognizing
the United States’ ability to make its own decisions, thus giving the
new country a second form of recognition. For the French, the
whole process of recognizing the United States as a country was
part of their initial plan for balancing the power in Europe, which
ultimately shifted to an attempt to make the United States a
satellite country, but ended with France giving full power to the
United States once the Americans looked at the Dutch for
20

John Ferling, “John Adams, Diplomat,” The William and Mary Quarterly Vol.
5, no. 2 (April 1994): 245.
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economic help, allowing them to make their own decisions in
foreign diplomacy.
Dutch Perspective
Unlike France, the United Province’s foreign policy varied in
many aspects, as the Dutch found themselves in a different
position compared to the French. Even though the French were in a
position of debt and struggling to keep up with the British during
the Revolutionary War, the French monarchy was still able to
compete with the British and create a balance of power in Europe.
The Dutch, however, were on a decline from the Golden Age
(1588–1672) of the previous century as their economic and
political strength slowly diminished throughout Europe and their
overseas colonies. The United Provinces found themselves in a
position in which the country wanted to restore its once glorious
self. Recognizing the United States as a country was a risky action
for the Dutch compared to the French because of the risk of war
with Great Britain that threatened the Dutch, which stalled their
recognition of the United States as a sovereign country.
The main strength of the United Provinces lied in their
economic superiority against the European countries, such as Great
Britain, France, and Spain, who colonized the Americas, Africa,
and Asia. As time passed, this economic power slowly diminished.
By the eve of the Revolutionary War in the late eighteenth century,
the Dutch economy was faltering compared to its golden age.
Thus, for the Dutch, protecting their economy became the main
priority and was crucial to the decision of recognizing the United
States. In fact, recognizing the United States was a large risk due to
two factors. For one, the recognition of the United States meant
war with Great Britain, meaning Dutch trading ships were to be
intercepted and trade decreased. The second reason was more
dangerous to the preservation of the Dutch economy. By
recognizing the United States as a sovereign country, the Dutch
were inviting a new competitor into the global market, one with a
vast abundance of resources and the ability to trade with many
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European countries. In other words, the recognition of the United
States as a sovereign country could have long-term repercussions
for the Dutch.
The Dutch primarily feared the direct influence that a war
could have on their economy. Dutch Ambassador to the United
States, Charles William Frederick Dumas (1721–1796), better
known as C. W. F. Dumas, made this clear in communications
with the various representatives of the United States. In a letter to
Benjamin Franklin on October 2, 1778, Dumas requested a
declaration from the Americans that trade be secured between the
two countries to “calm the Dutch fear that the British might
succeed in having them excluded.”21 In order to safeguard the
economy of their country, the Dutch needed assurances that their
trade with the new country (the United States) would not only
maintain steady, but also potentially increase. A treaty of
commerce, similar to the one the United States made with the
French, needed to be signed for the Dutch to recognize the United
States as it “calm the Dutch fear that the British might succeed in
having them excluded—in a whole or in part, directly or
indirectly—from trade with the United States.”22
Why was this treaty needed to ensure the stability of trade
between the Dutch and the United States? During the
Revolutionary War, the United States and the United Provinces
maintained a healthy trade relationship despite the war between the
United States and Great Britain, as the United States was using
Dutch ports to trade and store their ships overseas.23 However, the
relationship between the Dutch and British deteriorated as the
Revolutionary War progressed, for the Dutch were leaning towards
21

C. W. F. Dumas, “C. W. F. Dumas to Benjamin Franklin: A Translation, 2
October 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, October 2, 1778,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-07-02-0073-0002.
22
Dumas, “C. W. F. Dumas to Benjamin Franklin: A Translation, 2 October
1778.”
23
The American Commissioners, “The American Commissioners to the
Committee for Foreign Affairs, 30 November 1777,” Founders Online, National
Archives, November 30, 1777,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-02-0150.
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supporting the Americans and French rather than remaining
neutral.24 The primary factor that restricted Dutch actions was the
threat of war with the British. In the letter that Dumas sent to
Franklin, the British intention of weakening the Americans with
the restriction of trade was anticipated.25
In 1780, however, war broke out between the Dutch and
British. This war was separate from the Revolutionary War that the
Americans and French were fighting. This war was also a crucial
point. Since this war was separate from the War of Independence
that the Americans and French were fighting, the Dutch could sue
for peace in their war with the British at any point because they
were not part of the Treaty of Alliance that the French and
Americans created requiring the consent of both countries who
signed the treaty. The effect that peace between the Dutch and the
British would mean the British could once more focus on the war
in North America, rather than having to split their resources
between two wars. This was harmful for both the United States and
France as they both had stakes in the outcome of the Revolutionary
War.
Yet, there was still the long-term effect that the recognition
of the United States had on the Dutch, leading to the United
Provinces hesitation of recognition. With the United States being a
sovereign country, they would be able to trade with whomever
they pleased and not rely on the British, potentially leading to the
Dutch losing that part of the trade due to the United States’ ability
to trade its natural resources, directly competing with the Dutch in
many aspects of the trade market. In a letter from Adams to the
President of Congress, Samuel Huntington (1786–1796), Adams
claims the Dutch will “find a powerful rivalry from that maritime
24

Though this source is closer to the time period in which the Dutch Republic
recognized the United States as a country, it still reflects the sentiment the Dutch
felt the years prior to this development. John Adams, “From John Adams to
John Jay, 26 November 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, November
26, 1781, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-12-02-0054.
25
Dumas, “C. W. F. Dumas to Benjamin Franklin: A Translation, 2 October
1778.”
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people, the Americans.”26 This competition led to the United
Provinces’ hesitation in recognizing the United States, as this
competition would lead to a loss instead of a gain. Within this
same letter, Adams questioned the right of the Dutch to own the
Spice Islands (the Maluku Islands, an archipelago east of
Indonesia), which were a large part of the Dutch economy for
centuries (1620–1810).27 Even though it was not intentional,
Adams tried to establish that the main goal of the country was to
be an economic participant. Adams directly challenged the Dutch
Republic’s trade, which made the Dutch question whether or not
the recognition of the United States truly was beneficial to them. In
a letter written in 1782, Adams notes that “hopes have never been
strong in anybody, of inducing the Republick [sic] to a sudden
Alliance with France and America.”28
It was not until the Dutch-American Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, signed on September 6, 1782, that the United
Provinces’ secured economic security with the United States. The
treaty established that ships from each country would be protected
by both countries, in addition to allowing merchants from each
respective country to trade freely within the other’s borders.29 The
Dutch gained the economic security it wished from the new
country, while the United States achieved recognition from a
second European country. Even though the United Provinces
decline continued after the Anglo-Dutch and Revolutionary Wars,
this treaty ensured the continual commercial relationship between
the Dutch and the United States. In a completely separate effort
26

John Adams, “I. To the President of Congress, No. 49, 19 April 1780,”
Founders Online, National Archives, April 19, 1780,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-09-02-0115-0002.
27
Adams, “I. To the President of Congress, No. 49, 19 April 1780.”
28
John Adams, “From John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, 21 February 1782,”
Founders Online, National Archives, February 21, 1782,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-12-02-0162.
29
John Adams, States General of the Netherlands, “VIII. Final Text of the
Dutch-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce: A Translation, 6 September
1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, September 6, 1782,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0162-0011-0002.
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from the Americans, the French used the United Province’s
recognition of the United States as a way to prevent peace between
the Dutch and British, but also as a way to not make France reliant
on the Dutch via the creation of a treaty.30 As both wars
progressed, the Dutch started to both fear and rely on the French,
as the French were increasingly more involved in Dutch affairs.
American Perspectives
Regardless, even though the recognition of the United States
eventually became important for both the French and the Dutch in
their own views, the recognition of the new country was arguably
not as important as for the Americans themselves. The Americans
were the ones constantly pushing for this recognition as it was
important for them to be thought of as an actual country that could
make their own decisions, independent from the British.
In respect to the two cases of the French and the Dutch,
there were two figures in American history that spearheaded the
process of recognition: Benjamin Franklin and John Adams. Both
Franklin and Adams were vital to securing the recognition of the
United States by the French and Dutch. Franklin was the leading
figure of the American Commissioners who negotiated with the
French and eventually became the leading diplomat of the United
States to France. Adams, on the other hand, became the American
diplomat for the Dutch after Adams began to question the
intentions of the French with the United States.31 Each was an ideal
diplomat for the respective countries they were representing, and
they allowed the United States to establish its own influence in
international affairs within the first few years of the country’s
independence.

30

James Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
(University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1980).
31
Ferling, 241.
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Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790)
The diplomatic life of Benjamin Franklin has been subject
to much discussion. Historian and author, Jonathan Dull, provides
a discussion on how Franklin became a diplomat and explores his
actions while acting as the diplomat of the United States to
France.32 Historian Maurice Couve de Murville even makes the
claim that “no one today would seriously question... one the
greatest diplomats of all time.”33 Even though the statement by de
Murville could be heavily debated, there is no denying that
Franklin was a vital player in securing the French recognition of
the United States as a country. Franklin led the negotiations
between the French and Americans for the American side,
constantly attempting to place the United States in the best possible
position in any given situation. Whether it was following French
orders or pushing for American demands, Franklin was the man
leading the American Commissioners, gaining the respect from
those high up in the French socioeconomic hierarchy, such as
Gravier.
One of the larger aspects that allowed Franklin to be such
an influence in the diplomacy between the United States and
France was the recognition of Franklin’s position within the United
States. Being highly thought of throughout the United States by his
peers, Franklin was well versed in the state the country was in.
This sentiment of Franklin’s knowledge was shown by his friend
Jacques Barbeu-Dubourg (1709–1779), French physician, botanist,
writer, translator and publisher. In a letter Barbeu-Dubourg wrote
to Franklin, he questioned why he, Barbeu-Dubourg, should be the
one to bring up the American cause to the French court:

32

Jonathan R. Dull, “Franklin the Diplomat: The French Mission,” Transactions
of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 72, no. 1 (1982): 1-76.
33
Maurice Couve de Murville, “Benjamin Franklin: The Diplomat and
Journalist,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 100, no. 4
(1956): 316-325.
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Comment m’ingerer dans une suite
d’affaires majeures et de negociations
importantes sur la simple parole d’un
inconnu, soi disant porteur de lettres qu’il ne
sauroit representer? Comment m’annoncer
moi même à quantité de gens en place,
connus et inconnus, pour traiter avec eux des
affaires d’un peuple etranger sans la
moindre lettre de croyance de sa part?34
[How can I be part of major important
affairs and negotiations of the word of a
stranger, who sends letters of those who he
can’t represent? How can I announce myself
to so many people, known or unknown, to
try and deal with affairs of unknown people
without a single belief for themselves?]
By doing this, Barbeu-Dubourg gave Franklin the impression that
he had to be one to go to France to represent the United States, as
he, as a Frenchman, could not represent well the people of a nation
unknown. The Frenchmen recognized that Franklin was
knowledgeable in the affairs of the soon to be new country.
Before Franklin left to represent the United States in
France, he was already leading diplomatic relations for the United
States. Right after the United States declared itself independent
from Great Britain, Franklin instructed American Founding Father,
merchant, politician, and diplomat, and a supporter of American
independence, Silas Deane (1737–1789), to tell the courts of
Europe, with more emphasis on the French court, that the colonies
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were separated from the British.35 This letter, intended for Deane,
demonstrates Franklin’s ability to delegate tasks for the recognition
of the United States, such as him ordering Deane to “immediately
communicate the piece (Declaration of the Congress for a final
separation of Great Britain) to the Court of France, and send copies
of it to the other Courts of Europe,” as he was immediately
attempting to gain support from European courts. Eventually,
Congress sent Franklin, alongside American diplomat Arthur Lee
(1740–1792), to France to join Deane who had been in France
since July 1776, to discuss how the French could help the war
effort. Together, the three came to be known as the American
Commissioners, a group of diplomats who represented the United
States when discussing foreign policy with other countries, though
Deane would be forced to leave under a veil of suspicion that he
was aiding the British. The American Commissioners, led by
Franklin, were the ones in France negotiating the Treaty of
Alliance of 1778, making the French recognition of the United
States official.
As previously mentioned, the Battle of Saratoga was a
crucial turning point of the Revolutionary War, as this battle
demonstrated to the French the United States’ ability to be a
worthy ally against the British. Following the battle, Conrad
Alexadre-Gérard immediately sent a letter to the American
Commissioners to discuss the creation of an alliance between the
French and the Americans. Franklin saw this as the perfect
opportunity to receive recognition from the French. The American
Commissioners quickly responded to the letter stating that they
were “desirous of a conference with you [Alexadre-Gérard] on a
subject, that appears to us of importance.”36 For the Americans,
35
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this conference was for the recognition of a sovereign country that
can make its own decisions without approval of any power.
However, within this letter, there is a tone of desperation. In
sending this letter, the Americans are portraying an image that they
need the recognition of the French over any other aspect of an
alliance, such as defense or economic support. This desperation for
recognition allowed the French to create a treaty, the Treaty of
Alliance, that benefited them more than the Americans.
Additionally, this desperation appeared once more when the
Americans began discussing the details within the Treaty of
Alliance and were ultimately accepting of the terms. They did,
however, require that “Sovereignty…be inserted in the two places
propos’d [sic].”37 The Americans once more were focused on the
recognition aspect instead of creating a treaty that portrayed an
image of the new country as an equal to established countries.
Eventually, this led to a split within the American dignitaries as to
how diplomacy should be done. In particular, it created
disagreements between Franklin and Adams.
While Adams wanted more activity to be done so that the
United States would not be so reliant on France, Franklin, in the
eyes of Adams, was only attempting to please the French court.
Adams stated that Franklin “loves his Ease, hates to offend, and
seldom gives any Opinion until obliged to do it.”38 Adams did not
enjoy Franklin’s method of diplomacy, as he felt the tactic of
pleasing people was making the United States more of a colony to
France rather than an independent country. Eventually, Franklin’s
image, in the eyes of Adams, deteriorated leading him to insult and
question Franklin’s ability. In a letter to American lawyer,
politician, and Founding Father, Thomas McKean (1734–1817),
Adams described Franklin as a “Wit, and a Humourist… he is not
a sufficient Statesman, he knows too little of American Affairs or
37
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the Politicks [sic] of Europe, and takes too little Pains to inform
himself of Either.”39 At this point, Adams held the belief that
Franklin was doing nothing to help the American cause. Instead,
according to Adams, Franklin was protecting French interests
which were to keep the United States in a position of dependency
on the French. As soon as Adams got the opportunity to do so, he
looked for other ways to raise money so the United States could be
a sovereign country that did not economically rely on a European
power.
John Adams (1735–1826)
John Adams, one the original founding fathers, became a diplomat
for the United States to European countries to secure alliances and
financial aid. Although he is an important factor as to why the
United States managed to secure recognition from both the French
and the Dutch, his ability as a diplomat has been under heavy
scrutiny. Historian James Hutson even goes as far to say that
Adams was not crucial at all, claiming that Adams was not
important in securing the recognition of the United States by the
Dutch.40 However, historian John Ferling and his depiction of how
Adams should be represented as a diplomat is a more accurate
method to understanding Adams and his viewpoints on recognition
because of the bias Hutson exhibits against Adams.41 Though the
39
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recognition of the United States was important for Adams, he was
more concerned with the overall well-being of the country and its
ability to be recognized as a sovereign country.
For Adams, the most important goal for the new country
was economic prosperity. When discussing with the President of
Congress, Adams stated that the American Revolution would have
a large effect on Europe: “None of the Powers of Europe, and few
of the most knowing Politicians, have considered, what Effect this
Revolution will have on the general [economic] system of
Europe.”42 With this statement, the economic system of Europe
was included in what the American Revolution influenced. In the
same letter, Adams went into detail about how the recognition of
the United States would influence the developing world system. By
claiming that “in this branch of commerce, the Dutch would find a
powerful Rivalry, from that maritime people the Americans,”
Adams directly states that one way the new country would
influence European economies is through competition.43 By having
the United States as a recognized country, then other countries
would trade with them. Automatically, the United States, by
becoming its own independent country was not only weakening the
British economy to an extent, but it also allowed other European
countries to find new trade options.
In addition to this, Adams acknowledged that the
recognition of the United States meant that the United States would
have control over the natural resources that are available within
their country. One of the reasons as to why the United States were
a competitor to the established European nations is due to the
plethora of natural resources. The United States, for example,
could control trade within the Americas, as the influence of
perspectives Ferling attempted to change, demonstrating that Adams beforehand
was viewed unfairly. The purpose of this article was to “reconsider Adams by
exploring his motives and behavior during the War of Independence through the
prism of his comprehension of how to serve America’s national interests.”
Ferling, “John Adams, Diplomat,” 227-252.
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European countries was waning.44 Furthermore, all of the British
possessions in the colonies that aided in building up the British
economy would belong to the United States as soon as they
conceded the war. According to Adams:
With the Independence of America, we must
give up our fisheries ‘on the banks of
Newfoundland in the American seas.’
Supposing this true, which it is not at the
present, but our infatuation in continuing the
war may make it so, what follows? If Britain
lose them, who will gain them? France and
America. Have not France and America then
as urgent a motive to contend for the gain, as
we prevent the loss?45
With this letter, Adams made it clear that the former possessions
belong to the United States and, to a certain extent, France as well.
This transfer of possessions that would occur once the British lost
the war and recognized the United States as a sovereign nation
made the United States a prosperous commercial nation. However,
in the view of Adams, as we will see, this was in danger because of
the French.
As previously mentioned, there were two parts in the
process of gaining France’s recognition of the United States. There
was the actual recognition during the Treaty of Alliance in 1778, in
which France recognized the United States on paper, and the
second came in the form of the recognition of the sovereignty of
the United States and its ability to make its own decisions without
consulting other countries. The second form of recognition came to
be because Adams recognized how the French were treating the
Americans in regard to foreign policy. Adams acknowledged that
the relationship and alliance between the United States and France
44
45
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“naturally coincide with their several views and interests, as soon
as American Independence shall be acknowledged by the power of
Europe.”46 However, in Adams perspective, this relationship
between the two countries was one sided. He realized that the
United States was developing as a nation reliant on France instead
of growing as a self-sufficient country: “America will naturally
wish, while she is rising from her infant state into opulence and
power, to cover her dominions under the protection of France.”47
In the area of commerce, if the United States were to be reliant on
the protection of their ships by the French navy, then, by proxy,
American trade is reliant on the French rather than being an
independent network. The goal that was set by the United States
early on was to be a country that did not participate in European
wars, but rather a country that traded with whomever wished to do
so, as stated by Adams when he said “but it will not be the interest
of America to go to war with any power of Europe, it will certainly
be her interest to trade with every power of Europe.”48 The alliance
that was created between the French and the Americans prevented
this goal from occurring. If the French did not want to protect the
American ships from trading with a country, then the original
policy regarding trade that the United States wanted to implement
was at risk. Thus, this arising situation led Adams to look at other
countries for financial aid, rather than completely relying on the
French.
The opportunity came for Adams when he left France for
the United Provinces on July 27, 1780. Though it was against the
wishes of Gravier and Franklin, Adams thought it crucial to seek a
loan from the Dutch, while at the same time establishing
diplomatic relations with other countries. In a letter to the
President of Congress, Adams wrote, “I am sure, that a Loan might
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be obtained, by any one, with Power of Congress.”49 This
statement from Adams is important for two reasons. First, it
established that the loan the United States needed could be
obtained. Second, and arguably more important, is Adams’ claim
that the United States ultimately had the power to decide who it
traded with. By using the phrase “with Power of Congress,”
Adams clarified that the ultimate power over national decisions
rested with the government of the United States without the
consultation of the French. Here, Adams began to separate the
United States from France.
Even though Adams pushed for the loan to establish the
recognition of the United States, the loan fell through. The capture
of Henry Laurens (1723–1792), an American political leader
involved in negotiating Dutch support for the Revolutionary War,
by the British in 1780 made tensions rise between the Dutch and
the English. This meant that if the United Provinces did give the
loans to the United States, then the Dutch were going directly
against the British crown and war would break out between the
two.50 Even though the Dutch public was in favor of the Americans
because, according to Adams, there was a “Spirit of Resentment
against the English,” the Dutch were not interested in going to war
against the English.51 Nevertheless, Adams had accomplished his
goal of attaining recognition by the Dutch, showing that Americans
were not reliant on France but an independent country. Instead of
having to entrust France to take action, the United States could be
self-reliant with its decisions, such as looking for loans and
creating alliances with other countries. The involvement of Adams
in the diplomacy of the United States aided them in being
recognized as a sovereign and independent country, rather than a
sovereign but dependent one.
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British Recognition
Regardless of how important the recognition of the United States
by the French and Dutch were, the ultimate form of recognition
came from Great Britain. Although France was the first major
European power to recognize the United States and Dutch
recognition established the United States as its own independent
country that was not reliant on France, the British recognition of
the United States finalized the Revolutionary War and made US
sovereignty official to the rest of Europe. The language of the
treaty between Great Britain, the United States, and France is
something of note. The Treaty of Paris (1783) was in a way how
the British asserted its continued dominance over the Americans,
even if the treaty granted what the United States wanted:
sovereignty and independence.
Within the preamble of the Treaty of Paris, the recognition
of sovereignty of the United States still coincides with the idea that
the United States was reliant on France. Great Britain notes that a
treaty, the Treaty of Peace, with the United States was agreed upon
beforehand, but the Treaty of Paris was not finalized until peace
between the British and French was agreed upon. The Treaty of
Paris stated,
To constitute the treaty of peace proposed to be
concluded between the crown of Great Britain and
the United States, but which treaty was not to be
concluded until terms of peace should be agreed
upon between Great Britain and France, and his
Britannic Majesty should be ready to conclude such
treaty accordingly.52
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This statement affirmed the previously mentioned Article 8 of the
Treaty of Alliance.53 With the inclusion of the provision that the
Treaty of Paris could not be finalized until the French agreed to its
terms, Great Britain made the United States appear to the rest of
the European powers that they were not at a point in which they
could be self-reliant, but rather were still in need of the presence of
a European power. Although the purpose of the Treaty of Paris was
to recognize the United States as a country, the treaty itself still
questioned whether the new country had complete sovereignty or
not.

Figure 3. Signing of the Treaty of Paris. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.54

This was not the only location within the Treaty of Paris
where the sovereignty of the United States was questioned. Within
53
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Article 1 of the treaty, where Great Britain recognized the United
States, there was doubt created regarding the recognition of the
United States by other countries. As the wording of the article
states,
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said
United States… to be free, sovereign, independent
States; that he treats with them as such; and for
himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all
claims to the government, propriety and territorial
rights of the same, and every part thereof.55
This statement within the treaty establishes the idea that the United
States were property of the British crown up until the Treaty of
Paris was signed. This had various effects in regard to the
recognition of the United States. For one, the image of the United
States as an independent country could be debated. There was a
perception that what the United States had attained (sovereignty)
was only achieved because the King of Great Britain relinquished
his control of the American colonies, instead of the image in which
the United States earned its independence. Likewise, this statement
created an idea that all of the previous treaties and negotiations that
the Americans had with countries (such as France and the United
Provinces) were void. If Great Britain was claiming that the United
States were not independent until the King said they were in 1783,
then recognition by the French and Dutch in the years prior were
invalidated. Once more, the British were attempting to devalue the
recognition of the United States by diminishing the importance of
having them as an ally within those treaties. For the British, this
was an effort to limit the effects of losing their colonies. By
portraying American independence as an act of benevolence on
behalf of the British crown, the British were maintaining their
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reputation around the world and elevating their negotiation power
with other countries.
Conclusion
The recognition of the United States was not only beneficial for the
new country itself and its reputation, but also for the countries that
recognized it. There was an interactivity in place that influenced at
what point and how the United States achieved recognition from
each country. By examining the French, Dutch, and British
perspectives in recognizing the United States, one can see various
factors that influenced each country’s decision in recognizing the
United States. For the French, the value of a worthy ally to
maintain a balance of power in Europe was sufficient for
recognition. Though they recognized the United States in a treaty
in 1778, the French considered the new country more as an
independent French colony. This was the situation up until 1780,
when the United States looked to negotiate with other countries for
loans instead of just being reliant on the French. In the case of the
United Provinces, the main worry of the country was the economic
influence that the recognition of the United States would cause on
their own trade market. By recognizing the new country, the Dutch
not only gained a new trade competitor, but also started a war with
Great Britain, one of their largest trade partners. Eventually, war
broke out between the Dutch and British in 1781, making the
recognition of the United States appear more favorable to the
public of the United Provinces as a whole as it allowed them to
have another trade partner and preserve their economic empire for
slightly longer.
With the British, the process of recognition was difficult. If
the British crown recognized the thirteen colonies as an
independent country, they would lose possession of what was
arguably their most valuable colony. However, the Revolutionary
War reached a point in which continuing the war effort was not
wise, leading the British to formally recognize the United States
with the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Within the treaty, the British
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attempted to reduce the importance of recognition by positing that
the British allowed the United States to be an independent country,
rather than recognizing that the Americans fought and defeated the
British in a war for independence.
Though the recognition of the United States was a priority
for all Americans, there were conflicts within the American camp
between some of the leading figures. Benjamin Franklin, for
example, was an individual who advocated primarily for the
recognition of the United States via treaty, regardless of the
position the country found itself in. John Adams, on the other
hand, supported the idea of establishing a solid foundation among
European countries during the process of recognition, rather than
being reliant on any one European country. Even with the
infighting, the main goal for all Americans was recognition. The
process of recognition is difficult not only within the country
attempting to be independent, but also within the countries who
debate whether or not the proposed country is legitimate. By
examining the process and difficulties surrounding the recognition
of the United States, one can better understand why countries
today still have not been recognized by the global community.
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